I Will Argue That In The Literal

The Problem Posed By Indirect Speech Acts Is The Problem Of How It Is Possible For The Speaker To Say One Thing And Mean That But Also To Mean Something Else.

Our Tools Are Extensions Of Our Purposes, And So We Find It Natural To Make Metaphorical Attributions Of Intentionality To Them; But I Take It No Philosophical Ice Is Cut By Such Examples.

The Assertion Fallacy Is The Fallacy Of Confusing The Conditions For The Performance Of The Speech Act Of Assertion With The Analysis Of The Meaning Of Particular Words Occurring In Certain Assertions.

It Seemed To A Number Of Philosophers Of Language, Myself Included, That We Should Attempt To Achieve A Unification Of Chomsky's Syntax, With The Results Of The Researches That Were Going On In Semantics And Pragmatics. I Believe That This Effort Has Proven To Be A Failure. Though Chomsky Did Indeed Revolutionize The Subject Of Linguistics, It Is Not At All Clear, At The End The Century, What The Solid Results Of This Revolution Are. As Far As I Can Tell There Is Not A Single Rule Of Syntax That All, Or Even Most, Competent Linguists Are Prepared To Agree Is A Rule.

Materialism Ends Up Denying The Existence Of Any Irreducible Subjective Qualitative States Of Sentience Or Awareness.