Set Theory In Sheep's Clothing.

Theory May Be Deliberate, As In A Chapter On Chemistry, Or It May Be Second Nature, As In The Immemorial Doctrine Of Ordinary Enduring Middle-sized Physical Objects.

If There Is A Case For Mental Events And Mental States, It Must Be That The Positing Of Them, Like The Positing Of Molecules, Hassome Indirect Systematic Efficacy In The Development Of Theory.

Scientific Method Is The Way To Truth, But It Affords, Even In Principle, No Unique Definition Of Truth. Any So-called Pragmatic Definition Of Truth Is Doomed To Failure Equally.

An Indirect Quotation We Can Usually Expect To Rate Only As Better Or Worse, More Or Less Faithful, And We Cannot Even Hope For Astrict Standard Of More And Less; What Is Involved Is Evaluation, Relative To Special Purposes, Of An Essentially Dramatic Act.

Physical Objects Are Conceptually Imported Into The Situation As Convenient Intermediaries Not By Definition In Terms Of Experience, But Simply As Irreducible Posits Comparable, Epistemologically, To The Gods Of Homer . . . For My Part I Do, Qua Lay Physicist, Believe In Physical Objects And Not In Homer's Gods; And I Consider It A Scientific Error To Believe Otherwise. But In Point Of Epistemological Footing, The Physical Objects And The Gods Differ Only In Degree And Not In Kind. Both Sorts Of Entities Enter Our Conceptions Only As Cultural Posits.